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KICKING EMPLOYERS WHILE THEY ARE DOWN:
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE
ANTI-KICKBACK ACT
Daniel Horner+
“‘Defense contractors cannot take advantage of the ongoing war effort by
accepting unlawful kickbacks,’ said Tony West, Assistant Attorney General of
the Civil Division of the United States Department of Justice.”1 Kickbacks are
defined under federal law as any “thing of value or compensation of any kind
that is provided to . . . improperly obtain or reward favorable treatment.”2
Subcontractors often use kickbacks to obtain favor in the award of contracts by
prime contractors.3 This conduct led to the creation of the National Procurement
Fraud Task Force in 2006 to help eliminate the perceived corrupt practice of
kickbacks in government procurement.4 The Task Force was comprised of many
individuals, representing, inter alia, the United States Attorneys’ Office, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Inspectors General
Office.5 Through the task force and other efforts, the U.S. Government has been
successful in prosecuting numerous kickback schemes, ranging from fraudulent
charges for non existent air shipments to Iraq to overcharged rent payments on
shipping containers sent to Kuwait.6 Recently, the Government filed civil claims
against contractors who allegedly inflated bills to the U.S. Government for work
done by Kuwaiti companies, a contractor who subcontracted “to supply fuel
tankers for more than triple the tankers’ value,” and a contractor who made lease
payments “for trucks that had already been returned to the subcontractor.”7
Historically, according to at least one source, the degree of procurement fraud
in government contracting fluctuated with the level of defense spending in
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J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
2012, Mount Saint Mary’s University. I would like to thank Professor A.G. Harmon for his
guidance and suggestions, the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law Review for their time
and effort, and my family for their continued support throughout my time in law school.
1. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Intervenes in Suit
Against KBR and Panalpina Alleging Kickbacks Under the False Claims Act (May 5, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/May/10-civ-529.html.
2. 41 U.S.C. § 8701(2) (2012).
3. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962.
4. See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Greg Farrell, U.S. Sues Kellogg, Brown & Root Over Iraq Kickbacks Claims (1),
BUSINESSWEEK.COM (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-23/u-dot-sdot-sues-kellogg-brown-and-root-over-claims-of-iraq-kickbacks.
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America.8 In a typical scenario, after being awarded a contract, a prime
contractor often subcontracts parts of the work.9 Subcontractors may be tempted
to offer kickbacks to reward or to incentivize preferred treatment by the prime
contractor.10 Such schemes date back to the Civil War, and reportedly spike
coinciding with defense spending during times of armed conflict.11 In 1946,
Congress enacted the federal Anti-Kickback Act (“the Act” or “AKA”) in
response to the perceived increase in kickbacks during World War II.12
Congress strengthened the Anti-Kickback Act in 1986.13 The amended Act
has reportedly been successful in helping the government recover money lost
through procurement fraud.14 For the fiscal years 2005 and 2006, the
Department of Justice reported that the United States recovered more than 4.5
billion dollars in settlements and judgments from the pursuit of fraud, including
an unspecified number of kickback cases.15
The Anti-Kickback Act, as amended and codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701 et seq.,
imposes both criminal and civil liability on violators.16 The civil suit provision
has two components.17 Subsection (a)(1) states that the government may recover
double the amount of money involved from a violator of the Act who knowingly
accepts a kickback, as well as an additional $10,000, or less, per occurrence.18
Subsection (a)(2) states that, regardless of knowledge, any employer whose
employee violates the Act is subject to a civil penalty equal to the amount of the
kickback accepted.19

8. See Sandy Keeney, The Foundations of Government Contracting, J. CONT. MGMT. 16–
18 (2007), http://www.ago.noaa.gov/acquisition/docs/Foundations_of_contracting_with_the_
federal_government.pdf. “Between 2000 and 2005, procurement spending rose 86%, twice as fast
as other discretionary spending, which rose 43%. Indeed, federal contract expenditures now
consume almost 40 cents of every dollar of discretionary spending.” Gerald H. Lander et al.,
Government Procurement Fraud: Could SOX Be Used to Hold Contractors Accountable?, CPA J.
(Feb. 2008), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2008/208/infocus/p16.htm.
9. H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962.
10. David W. Burgett, Vicarious Corporate Liability for Double Damages Under the AKA—
Fifth Circuit Opens the Door to Punishing the Employer When Its Employees Self-Deal, GOV’T
CONTRACTOR (Thompson Reuters), Aug. 7, 2013, ¶ 240, at 1.
11. See Keeney, supra note 8, at 16–18.
12. See Margaret Schulenberger, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Federal Anti-Kickback Act (41 U.S.C.S. §§ 51–54), 19 A.L.R. 545, 548 (1974); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 99-964, at 3–4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960 (“The bill . . . prohibit[s] the
acceptance of a kickback, or the inclusion of its cost in a contract, as well as its payment.”).
13. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5960.
14. See Lander et al., supra note 8.
15. See id.
16. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8706–07 (2012).
17. Id. § 8706(a)(1)–(2).
18. Id. § 8706(a)(1).
19. See id. § 8706(a)(2).
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A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,20 potentially
expanded the exposure of government contractors under the Anti-Kickback Act
by introducing a theory of vicarious liability under subsection (a)(1), previously
thought to be available only under subsection (a)(2).21 In Vavra, an employee
of Kellogg Brown & Root accepted kickbacks on ninety-three occasions, which
led to a qui tam22 action under the federal False Claims Act and the AntiKickback Act.23 The government intervened and filed its own complaint,
alleging that the defendant-employer was vicariously liable for its employee’s
actions under subsection (a)(1), as well as strictly liable under subsection
(a)(2).24 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
dismissed that component of the claim, holding that subsection (a)(1) did not
create a cause of action for vicarious liability against employers.25
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that employers may be
vicariously liable under (a)(1) for acts of employees.26 The imposition of
vicarious liability substantially increases the government contractors’ potential
exposure for acts of their employees, including acts unknown to and
unauthorized by such contractors, because subsection (a)(1) provides for double
damages.27 This ruling holds employers accountable twice for the same acts of
their employees under both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).28 In addition, and even
more troubling, the Fifth Circuit suggested that an employee may only need
“apparent” authority to support a cause of action for vicarious liability.29
Apparent authority has little to do with the actual authority of an employee and
may be beyond the power of an employer to regulate.30 Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit imposed neither a requirement that the employer have actual knowledge
of the employee’s illegal conduct, nor a requirement that the employer receive

20. 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013).
21. See id. at 352–53.
22. Qui tam actions are “action[s] brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue
for a penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (9th ed. 2009).
23. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 345.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 343.
27. See Burgett, supra note 10, at 1 (stating that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Vavra “raise[d]
the stakes for contractors who fail to monitor their employees . . . . [I]llustrat[ing] that contractors’
potential exposure is great”).
28. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 348.
29. See id. at 351–52.
30. See Charles Davant IV, Employer Liability for Employee Fraud: Apparent Authority or
Respondeat Superior?, 47 S.D. L. REV. 554, 573 (2002) (“[A]pparent authority may apply even
though no relationship exists between the principal and the apparent agent.”).
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any benefit from the conduct, thereby increasing the likelihood that employers
may be found liable under subsection (a)(1) in the absence of any fault.31
This Note discusses why the majority and concurring opinions in Vavra were
incorrect in concluding that employers should be vicariously liable under
subsection (a)(1) of the civil penalty provision of the Anti-Kickback Act,
without also requiring some form of knowledge or intent of the employee to
benefit the employer. The Note reviews the Anti-Kickback Act’s history and
the development of the pertinent law. Then, this Note discusses vicarious
liability generally. Next, this Note analyzes the Fifth Circuit’s decision to hold
employers vicariously liable under section 8706(a)(1), despite the strict liability
provision of subsection (a)(2), as well as the Court’s holding that an employee
need only act with apparent authority to make the employer liable for his or her
acts. After discussing Vavra, and its imposition of liability on employers for
employees’ actions, including actions of which the employers were unaware,
this Note will explore the impact that the decision could have on government
contracting. To redress the unfortunate situation created by Vavra, this Note
proposes an elevated standard—a showing of an employee’s intent to benefit the
employer —to justify imputing employees’ knowledge to employers for
vicarious liability purposes.
I. THE ANTI-KICKBACK ACT’S FORMATION AND EARLY CASES
A. The Anti-Kickback Act
Kickbacks exist as “a form of commercial bribery.”32 Specifically, kickbacks
are defined as:
[A]ny money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or
compensation of any kind that is provided to a prime contractor, prime
contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee to
improperly obtain or reward favorable treatment in connection with a
prime contract or a subcontract relating to a prime contract.33
The Act forbids any person or business from “[p]roviding[,] . . . accepting, or
attempting to accept any kickback; and . . . including . . . the amount of any
prohibited kickback in the price charged by a subcontractor to a prime contractor
or higher-tier subcontractor, or in the price charged by the prime contractor to
the government.”34
31. See Vavra, 727 F.3d, at 350 (disagreeing with KBR’s arguments that there should be an
“intent-to-benefit requirement” and knowledge standard).
32. H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5962. (“Bribes
made to employees of a company with a contractual relationship to the government (either directly
as a prime contractor, or indirectly as a subcontractor) are termed kickback and governed by the
Anti-Kickback Act . . . .”).
33. 41 U.S.C. § 8701(2) (2012).
34. STEVEN FELDMAN & W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 35
(5th ed. 2011).
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The government found kickbacks were prevalent during World War II,
leading to the passage of the first version of the Act.35 The costs of such
kickbacks were built into subcontract prices and passed through the prime
contract to the government.36 The Act attempted to control the practice,
preventing the expense from ultimately falling on the taxpayer.37 Although it is
difficult to determine the government’s actual contract damages from a kickback
scheme, the harm may often be significant.38 The government also incurs costs
for investigating and prosecuting these schemes.39
1. The 1986 Amendments to the AKA
Prior to 1986, the Anti-Kickback Act was characterized as an “extraordinarily
ambiguous statute” because of the wording of the statute, “an inconclusive
legislative history,” and a lack of definitive precedent.40 Congress amended the
AKA in 1986 to make it more effective in preventing and punishing government
contractors’ kickback practices.41 According to the House Committee on
Government Operations, kickbacks “ha[d] become a pervasive problem in
Federal procurement.”42 The Committee found that the taxpayers bore the
burden of the kickback because the cost was built into the subcontract price and
included in the prime contract to the government.43 Consequently, the kickbacks
burdened the taxpayers.44

35. See Shulenberger, supra note 12, at 548–49 (explaining that the General Accounting
Office began discovering kickbacks while auditing “cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts” during World
War II).
36. See id. See also United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 143 (1967)
(explaining how the cost of kickbacks are passed on to the government).
37. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5962 (“In most cases,
the kickback cost is included in the subcontract price and passed along in the prime contract to the
government and, therefore, ultimately to the taxpayer.”).
38. See United States v. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. Va. 2000) (citing United States
v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 1998)). “[T]he government must incur additional
investigative and enforcement costs to ferret out and stop . . . abusive schemes,” and “Congress
stated that it established the penalty as ‘an amount which reasonably relates to the actual costs the
government suffers when kickbacks occur.’” Id. (quoting Lippert, 148 F.3d at 977).
39. Id.
40. United States v. Perry, 431 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1970).
41. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 473, 490
(E.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The AKA was amended in 1986 ‘to enhance
the government’s ability to prevent and prosecute kickback practices’ in connection with contracts
of the federal government.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5961)).
42. H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5961.
43. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5962.
44. Id.
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By 1986, the problem was so widespread that a senator described it as
“nationwide” and “well-entrenched.”45 Congress perceived the AKA’s existing
criminal and civil penalties as insufficient to deter misconduct.46 Furthermore,
the Act was limited in the scope of what it could punish.47 In response, Congress
broadened, strengthened, and clarified the Act by “rais[ing] the civil penalties,
for knowing violations, to twice the amount of the kickback involved and up to
$10,000 in fines.”48 Additionally, Congress’ amendments imposed “vicarious
civil liability, without regard to fault, on the Federal prime contractor and all
higher tier subcontractors for any kickbacks made by their subcontractors,” for
the amount of the kickback.49
2. The Courts’ Interpretation of the AKA
i. Defining “Knowingly”
The AKA does not define the term “knowingly,”50 and few cases have
analyzed this element, especially since the 1986 amendments.51 The term
“knowingly” generally requires a showing that the defendant was aware of the
facts constituting the offense, but not “proof that [the defendant] knew his acts
violated the law.”52 When the Act was amended, Senator Levin, the Chairman
and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
45. Id. at 6, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5963 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, Congressman John Bryant testified that “despite the pervasiveness of kickback
activity in Federal government subcontracting, there have been only eight convictions under [the]
Anti-Kickback Act during the past five years.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 8 (“The provisions of the Anti-Kickback Act are too narrow in scope and its
sanctions too weak, for the Act to be effectively used in deterring and prosecuting kickback
practices.”).
47. See id. at 8–9.
The first and foremost limitation on enforcement of the Act is the requirement that the
payment of a kickback be made to induce the award of a subcontract or order, or as an
acknowledgement of a subcontract order previously awarded . . . . A second major
limitation in the Act is its restriction to kickbacks made in relation to negotiated contracts.
Id.
48. Id. at 10.
49. Id.
50. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 8701, 8706 (2012). The civil suit provision of the AKA now reads:
The Federal Government in a civil action may recover from a person—(1) that knowingly
engages in conduct prohibited by section 8702 of this title a civil penalty equal to—(A)
twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and (B) not more than
$10,000 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and (2) whose employee,
subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates section 8702 of this title by providing,
accepting, or charging a kickback a civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.
Id. § 8706(a).
51. See 3 KAREN L. MANOS, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS COSTS & PRICING, § 91.24 (2d ed.
2014).
52. See id. (“However, the Supreme Court has construed the mens rea term ‘willfully’ to
require proof that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated a ‘known legal duty.’”).
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Management of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, stated, “[t]he
knowing . . . standard requires the Government to prove that the alleged
wrongdoer knew what he or she was doing and was not acting through mistake,
inadvertence or mere negligence.”53
One way to attempt to discern Congress’ intended interpretation of the AKA’s
language is to analyze the meaning of the same terms in similar statutes. Both
the federal False Claims Act (FCA)54 and federal Medicare Anti-Kickback
Statute (AKS)55 contain the word “knowingly.”56 Under the FCA, “knowingly”
is defined as having actual knowledge,57 deliberate ignorance, or reckless
disregard.58 In the AKS, the standard required is “knowingly and willfully,” a
higher bar than the “knowingly” standard in the FCA.59
These terms have been well defined by case law.60 At the least, these statutes
have used “knowingly” to describe a showing of a reckless failure to learn the
53. 132 Cong. Rec. 31,239, 31,299 (1986) (statement of Sen. Levin).
54. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2012).
56. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (imposing, in the FCA, liability on anyone who “knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b) (outlining, in the AKS, criminal penalties for a person who “knowingly and willfully
solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)”).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Advance Tool Co., 902 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (D. Mo. 1995),
aff’d, 86 F.3d 1159 (8th Cir. 1996) (presenting invoices for tools that were reverse engineered to
satisfy contract with government constituted actual knowledge). “[A]ctual knowledge . . . may be
demonstrated through circumstantial evidence.” CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:
FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 4:37 (2d ed. 2014). See United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469
F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the failure to disclose information may indicate actual
knowledge of falsity).
58. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729. Deliberate ignorance and reckless disregard are generally
considered together. See SYLVIA, supra note 57, § 4:38. The U.S. Senate described the standard
as a “refusal to learn of information which an individual, in the exercise of prudent judgment, had
reason to know.” S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 15 (1986). See United States ex rel. Farmer v. City of
Hous., 523 F.3d 333, 348 (5th Cir. 2008) (deciding reckless disregard under the FCA applies to
government contractors who claim that they were unaware of overcharges); United States v. Krizek,
111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing reckless disregard as extreme gross negligence);
United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55 (D.D.C. 2008) (explaining
reckless disregard is as “an extension of gross negligence, or gross-negligence-plus, and is not
merely a proxy for subjective intent”); UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 776, 792 n.15
(1999), aff’d, 249 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (describing reckless disregard as “gross negligenceplus” (quoting United States ex rel. Aakhus v. Dyncorp, Inc., 136 F.3d 676, 682 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
59. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or receives
any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind [is guilty of a felony].”), with 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (allowing actual
knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard to prove a violation of the FCA). The AKS
covers any agreement “where one purpose of the remuneration was to obtain money for the referral
of services or to induce further referrals.” United States ex rel. Westmoreland v. Amgen, Inc., 812
F. Supp. 2d 39, 47 (D. Mass. 2011) (citing United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir.1989);
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir.1985)).
60. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
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truth about an arrangement.61 These definitions of “knowingly” shed light on
the definition of the term in the AKA, and suggest that a level of culpability
beyond mere mistake or negligence, as proposed by Senator Levin, is needed to
prove a violation.62
ii. Damages Under the AKA
The damages outlined in the Anti-Kickback Act are both remedial and
punitive, with civil damages aimed at recovering the costs of the kickback borne
by the taxpayer.63 However, “the [AKA] calls the recovery a ‘penalty’ and it
permits a per occurrence penalty, which resembles a punitive fine.”64 A review
of the legislative history revealed that Congress intended to create both remedial
damages, aimed to compensate the government for expenses, and punitive
damages, meant to deter kickback practices.65 Even in the face of Eighth
Amendment challenges that the punitive damages are excessive, the courts have
been willing to uphold their use.66

61. See, e.g., Farmer, 523 F.3d at 348.
62. 132 Cong. Rec. 31,239, 31,299 (1986) (statement of Sen. Levin).
63. See United States v. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 413 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“The [AKA] itself
manifests both remedial and punitive intent. With its emphasis on the civil nature of this recovery,
the statute appears to establish remedial damages.”).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 413–14. The Act penalizes for “an amount which reasonably relates to the actual
costs the government suffers when kickbacks occur.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Kickbacks
usually cost the government more than the amount of the kickback itself, through “increased costs
from the delivery of substandard goods or by poor performance under the contract,” as well as the
“expenses [of] investigating and prosecuting kickback cases.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 15 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5960, 5972. Consequently, “[d]oubling the kickback payment
compensates [the government] for these greater costs.” Id. By allowing for an added recovery
under the Act of up to $10,000, the court can exercise its discretion to provide greater damages for
grievous offenses. Id. When the kickback itself is an insignificant amount, this added penalty can
serve as a deterrent. Id. The Committee believed that the additional damages were reasonable to
help the government recover from the harm suffered and to discourage the use of kickbacks. See
id.
66. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 414 (“Even if the Eighth Amendment is triggered by the AntiKickback statute, the penalties as applied in this case are not unconstitutionally excessive with
respect to either the gravity of the offense or the damages suffered by the government.”) In Kruse,
the defendants argued that the kickbacks at issue “came out of the profits paid to the government
contractor and that the government would have paid the same amount for the contract whether there
had been kickbacks or not.” Id. at 415. Applying a rational basis standard and examining the
legislative history, the court held that the Act was related to the government’s purpose of preventing
kickbacks, and found a “rational relationship between the amount of losses and the amount sought.”
Id. The court also found that the Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment, stating that,
“[p]rocedurally, Kruse has had several opportunities to contest the amount of the kickbacks . . .
Accordingly, the Court f[ound] that the Anti-Kickback statute does not violate the defendants’ Fifth
Amendment right to due process.” Id.
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B. Vicarious Liability
To understand the Fifth Circuit’s questionable interpretation of subsection
(a)(1), a review of vicarious liability is necessary. Vicarious liability, simply
stated, is liability for another person’s tort.67 Most commonly, vicarious liability
occurs in an employer-employee relationship, also known as respondeat
superior.68 This doctrine holds employers jointly liable, alongside the tortfeasor,
and severally liable, or individually responsible, for any torts that occurred while
the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment.69 In some
cases, the employee can serve as an agent of the employer, and bind the
employer to his or her actions.70 In government contracting, this occurs when
the employee of a prime contractor contracts with a subcontractor.
Generally, an employee’s actions are not considered within the scope of
employment unless the actions were specifically authorized or expected by the
employer.71 Therefore, the level of authority, and the scope of that authority,

67. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 333, at 905 (2000). This exception to the
notion that each person is accountable for his or her own actions is important for the recovery of
victims and outweighs the effect of punishing a person for actions in which he or she has no legal
fault. See id.
68. Id. “The most common kind of vicarious liability is based upon the principle of
respondeat superior. Under that principle, private and public employers are generally jointly and
severally liable along with the tortfeasor employee for the torts of employees committed within the
scope of employment.” Id. (footnote omitted). Some scholars have doubted whether respondeat
superior can be justified as a doctrine because it goes against common sense to punish one man for
another’s wrongdoing. Id. § 334, at 908 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, II, 5 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 14 (1891)). Others have criticized the doctrine as a method of reaching deeper pockets
than those of the person who committed the harmful action. Id. (citing T. BATY, VICARIOUS
LIABILITY 154 (1916)). Dobbs argued that courts have provided safeguards requiring a showing
of either formal control over the employee by the employer, or that the employer benefits from the
employee’s work. See id. § 335, at 910. These safeguards, along with the selective application of
vicarious liability to tort law, protect employers from any potential abuse of the doctrine. Id.
Selective applications means that “[w]hen the tort becomes uncharacteristic of the business,
liability is not imposed. Legal analysis of this idea is expressed as the rule that the master is liable
for the torts of his servants only if those torts are committed within the scope of the servant’s
employment.” Id.
69. Id. § 333, at 905.
70. See id.
71. Id. § 335, at 910. “Under the traditional rules, a servant’s conduct is not within the scope
of his employment unless it is of the same general kind as authorized or expected, or incidental to
such conduct, and the servant was acting within the authorized time and space limits.” Id. Some
jurisdictions require that the agent’s conduct have the purpose to serve the principal in order to be
considered within the scope of his employment. See id.; see, e.g., Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. McCoy,
244 S.W.3d 44, 52 (Ky. 2008) (holding that the proper way to determine scope of employment is
to focus on the employee’s intent to further the employer’s business). Other courts have expressly
rejected this test for scope of employment. See, e.g., Melin-Schilling v. Imm, 205 P.3d 905, 907–
09 (Wash. App. 2009) (stating that the scope of employment should be determined by examining
whether the employer should have foreseen the tortious conduct given the duties imposed by the
job itself).
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held by an employee is crucial to determining whether imposition of vicarious
liability is appropriate.72
1. Actual and Apparent Authority
As the Restatement (Third) of Agency states, an agent possesses actual
authority when the agent acts with the express direction of the principal.73
Actual authority may also refer to implied authority, which is the authority to do
anything:
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform an agent’s
express responsibilities or . . . to act in a manner in which an agent
believes the principal wishes the agent to act based on the agent’s
reasonable interpretation of the principal’s manifestation in light of the
principal’s objectives and other facts known to the agent.74
The agent’s interpretation is reasonable if it reflects the principal’s express
wishes or if, in the absence of clear directions, a reasonable person in the agent’s
position would interpret the principal’s wishes in that manner.75
In some instances an agent acts without actual authority, but is said to have
apparent authority.76 According to the authors of the Restatement (Third) of
Agency, “[a]pparent authority holds a principal accountable for the results of
third-party beliefs about an actor’s authority to act as an agent when the belief
is reasonable and is traceable to a manifestation of the principal.”77 Because it
is difficult for a third party to distinguish between an agent’s actual and apparent
authority, apparent authority “trumps restrictions that the principal has privately
imposed on the agent.”78 In order for a third party to establish apparent
authority, it is not necessary to find any fault on the part of the principal, but
only for the third party to show that the representations of the agent under the
circumstances make it fair to impose liability on the principal.79 In such cases,
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006).
73. See id. “Express authority” is a phrase used alongside actual authority to describe
“authority that a principal has stated in very specific or detailed language.” Id. § 2.01 cmt. b.
Essential to “determining whether an agent acted with actual authority is the agent’s reasonable
understanding at the time the agent takes action.” Id. § 2.01 cmt. c. The principal’s initial grant of
authority may be modified during the course of performance either through subsequent
manifestations or developments that the agent reasonably takes into consideration when
determining the principal’s wishes. Id.
74. Id. § 2.01 cmt. b.
75. See id. § 2.02(2).
76. Id. § 2.03.
77. Id. § 2.03 cmt. c.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 2.03 cmt. e; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1958).
“[A]pparent authority usually refers to a situation where an employer puts an employee, who lacks
actual authority, in a situation that makes it inequitable for the employer to deny relief to a third
party who reasonably relies on the acts of the employee.” John S. Pachter, Fifth Circuit Holds
Contractors Subject to Vicarious Liability for Employees Engaged in Kickbacks, SMITH PACHTER
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the employer may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its agents.80 However,
some jurisdictions have sought to limit the use of vicarious liability for the
imposition of damages on principals in certain circumstances.81
2. Limiting Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages
Disagreement exists between jurisdictions “over whether and how to limit
vicarious liability for punitive damages.”82 The Restatement (Second) of Agency
states that punitive damages can only be awarded if the employee was acting in
the scope of his or her employment.83 In contrast, the Restatement (Third) of
Agency proposes that an employee’s conduct be intended to benefit the employer
in some way before vicarious liability may attach.84
When determining whether vicarious liability applies in cases involving
punitive damages “the court should review the type of authority that the
employer has given to the employee, the amount of discretion that the employee
has in what is done and how it is accomplished.”85 However, the Supreme Court
has stated that these Restatement rules do not apply to special statutes, such as
antitrust laws, which are designed to deter future violations and compensate
victims.86 The Supreme Court also specified that to hold employers vicariously
liable, the employee should be in the upper hierarchy of the company, but not
necessarily the top management, officers, or directors.87

MCWHORTER PLC (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.smithpachter.com/post-detail.php?id=10152. See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. b (apparent authority doctrine is based on the
reasonable expectations of a third party). “Apparent authority . . . is operative in explaining a
principal’s vicarious liability when a third party’s reasonable belief in an agent’s authority to speak
or deal on behalf of a principal stems from a manifestation made by the principal . . . .” Id.
80. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 35:11, at 289–91
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 2007). If an injury would not have occurred but for the third party’s
reliance on the apparent authority of the agent, it is well-settled that tort liability exists. Id.
81. See infra Part II.B.2.
82. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 542 (1999).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 C.
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (“An employee’s act is not within the
scope of employment when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the
employee to serve any purpose of the employer.”). See e.g., Crouch v. J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., 562
F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (holding that statements made with intent to improve the
workplace are attributable to the employer due to the advancement of the employer’s purpose).
85. LINDA SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.4(B)(2)(a), at 186
(4th ed. 2000).
86. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575–76 (1982)
(“Since treble damages serve as a means of deterring antitrust violations and of compensating
victims, it is in accord with both the purposes of the antitrust laws and principles of agency law to
hold [a party] liable for the acts of agents committed with apparent authority.”)
87. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 543 (holding that employer could not be liable for punitive damages
for the discriminatory employment actions of managerial agents where the decisions were contrary
to the good faith efforts of the employer to comply with Title VII).
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Vicarious liability has been applied to causes of action under the FCA in
contexts similar to those under the AKA.88 In one FCA action, the court stated
that when the employee:
use[s] his knowledge and position of trust to take from the government
and the employer. . . . the “scope of the employment” test . . . is
excessively punitive to corporations victimized by the criminal acts of
their employees. Rather, the addition of requiring the government to
prove that the actions were for the purpose of benefitting the
corporation ensures that the FCA is not merely an effective weapon
against government fraud, but a just one as well.89
FCA actions are often litigated in conjunction with AKA actions, and it follows
that the statutes should be interpreted similarly.90 However, in Vavra, the Fifth
Circuit distinguished the AKA from the FCA, and held that the FCA’s elevated
standard was not applicable.91
III. U.S. EX REL. VAVRA V. KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, INC.: THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT IMPOSES VICARIOUS LIABILITY ON EMPLOYERS UNDER
SUBSECTION (A)(1)
In 2001, Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc. (“KBR”)92 contracted with the United
States Army “to provide global logistical services . . . [under the] Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program III.”93 This contract allowed the Army to issue tasks to
KBR on an on-going basis.94 KBR subcontracted some of its work to two
companies—EGL, Inc. and Panalpina, Inc.—to transport military equipment
and supplies to the Middle East.95

88. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding
that action under the AKA does not preempt action under the False Claims Act or federal common
law).
89. United States ex rel. Baker v. Rehab. Specialists of Livingston Cnty, Inc., No. 00-74410,
2008 WL 3834106, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2008).
90. See, e.g., Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 117, 121–22 (holding
a government contractor liable for maximum penalties and damages under both the AKA and the
FCA).
91. See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 353 (5th
Cir. 2013).
92. KBR is an engineering, procurement, and construction company that works heavily in
energy, petrochemicals, government services, and civil infrastructure projects. Company Profile,
KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, http://www.kbr.com/About/Company-Profile/ (last visited Oct. 11,
2013). The company employs approximately 27,000 people spread throughout seventy countries
across five continents. Id. KBR separated from Halliburton in 2006 and became publicly traded
on the New York Stock Exchange. History, KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, http://www.kbr.com/
about/history/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
93. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 344–45.
94. Id. at 345
95. Id.
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During the course of the contract, KBR’s Corporate Traffic Supervisor,
Robert Bennett, along with others in the transportation department, accepted
kickbacks from subcontractors, offered to make up for service failures on behalf
of the subcontractors, and ensured that the subcontractors continued to receive
work despite poor performance.96 These kickbacks included barbecues, meals
and drinks, golf outings, tickets to rodeo events, baseball games, football games,
and other sporting events.97 Bennett and the subcontractor who provided the
kickbacks pleaded guilty under the criminal provision of the AKA.98
Two relators,99 David Vavra and Jerry Hyatt, brought a qui tam100 suit against
KBR, the employee who accepted the kickbacks, and the subcontractors who
provided them under the FCA.101 The government intervened, as allowed under
the FCA, filed its own complaint in the matter replacing the relators’ claim, and
also brought a claim under 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) of the AKA.102 KBR filed a
12(b) motion to dismiss the government’s AKA claim, arguing that (a)(1) did
not provide for vicarious liability, and, furthermore, that because the employee
who accepted kickbacks was not acting to benefit the corporation, vicarious
liability would not be appropriate even if (a)(1) allowed for it.103
A. The District Court Decision
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted
KBR’s motion to dismiss the AKA claim, finding that the statute did not provide
for vicarious liability under subsection (a)(1).104 The court examined subsection
(a)(2), which states that “[t]he Federal Government in a civil action may recover
from a person . . . whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee
violates section 8702 of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback
a civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.”105 In undertaking its
statutory interpretation, the court sought “‘to give each word . . . [its] operative

96. See id.
97. Id.
98. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendant Kellogg Brown & Root,
Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint of the United States of America, at 7, United States ex rel.
Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 473, 482 (E.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d and
remanded, 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 1:04-cv-00042-MAC).
99. A relator is the name of a plaintiff who brings a qui tam action and files a public lawsuit
on behalf of the government. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1292 (9th ed. 2009).
100. A qui tam action is one in which “a statute . . . allows a private person to sue for a penalty,
part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive.” Id. at 1262. The
qui tam action in this case was initiated under the FCA. Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 478–79. The
government intervened and brought the AKA action against KBR alongside the FCA claim. Id.
101. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 345.
102. See id.
103. Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 479.
104. Id. at 488.
105. 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(2) (2012); Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490.
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effect’ and to render none superfluous.”106 Subsection (a)(2) provides for strict
liability any time an employee commits a violation of the Act.107 The court held
that subsection (a)(1), which states “[t]he Federal Government in a civil action
may recover from a person . . . that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by
[the Act],”108 would render subsection (a)(2) superfluous if vicarious liability
also existed under subsection (a)(1).109 To support its interpretation, the court
examined the legislative history of the Act.110
Moreover, the district court held that dismissal was appropriate because the
government had not alleged in its complaint that the KBR employees who
accepted kickbacks did so with the intent to benefit their employer.111 Central
to this assertion was the court’s interpretation of two Fifth Circuit decisions:
United States v. Hangar One, Inc.,112 and United States v. Ridglea State Bank.113
Hangar One involved the employee of a defense contractor who knowingly
submitted defective artillery shells to the government.114 Ridglea involved two
banks and a loan officer who fraudulently approved loan applications in the
course of his employment.115 In both of these cases, the Fifth Circuit held that
knowledge of an employee acting in violation of the law would not be imputed
to the employer unless the employee acted to benefit the employer.116
B. Vavra On Appeal: The Fifth Circuit’s Current Opinion on the AKA’s
Vicarious Liability
In reversing the district court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit first analyzed the
definition of “person” as it appears in 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1).117 The court noted
that the Act “defines ‘person’ to include both an ‘individual’ and ‘a corporation,
106. Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (quoting United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598, 603
(5th Cir. 2004)).
107. See 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(2).
108. Id. § 8706(a)(1).
109. Vavra, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 490–91.
110. Id. at 491. The court reasoned that “[p]rior to the AKA’s amendment in 1986, the statute
authorized a penalty only against subcontractors and individual recipients of kickbacks, rather than
prime contractors.” Id. According to the court, “[t]he statute’s amendment, in part, was designed
to enable the government to sue a prime contractor or a ‘higher tier subcontractor’ for a ‘lower tier
subcontractor’s’ AKA violation under a theory of vicarious liability.” Id. However, the court also
stated that “[t]he penalty for such vicarious liability is expressly limited to the amount of the
kickback.” Id.
111. Id.
112. 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[L]iability of a corporation for a False Claims Act
violation may arise from the conduct of employees other than those with ‘substantial authority and
broad responsibility.’”).
113. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966), superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
114. Hangar One, 563 F.2d at 1157.
115. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 496.
116. See Hangar One, 563 F.2d at 1158; Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 499–500.
117. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 346–47 (5th
Cir. 2013).
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partnership, business association of any kind, trust, [and] joint-stock
company.’”118 Consequently, the court defined KBR as a person under
subsection (a)(1).119 The court then turned to a textual and structural analysis of
41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) to determine whether it provides for vicarious liability.120
Ultimately, the court disagreed with the district court’s reading, which limited
employers’ responsibility for their employees to damages under subsection
(a)(2).121 The majority, considering the broad definition of the term “person,”
held that “[s]ince [s]ection [(a)(1)] makes corporations liable for kickback
activity, it requires attributing liability to corporate entities for that activity under
a rule of vicarious liability.”122 The court did not believe that its decision
rendered subsection (a)(2) superfluous, and opined that the difference between
the subsections was the punishment of a “knowing” violation under subsection
(a)(1) versus the strict civil penalty under subsection (a)(2).123 The majority
declined to define “knowingly” as it appears in (a)(1), instead, stating that the
determination of a knowing violation was a “nuanced, fact-reliant question
[under the AKA] unsuited for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.”124 The
court cited to its decision in Hangar One, which held that under FCA, “liability
of a corporation . . . may arise from the conduct of employees other than those
with substantial authority and broad responsibility.”125
The appellate court also disagreed with KBR’s second argument—that
heightened pleading standards should be applied if vicarious liability is available
under (a)(1) and that the government’s complaint did not meet that standard.126
Instead, the Fifth Circuit suggested that an employer is responsible for an
employee’s acts when they are performed within the scope of his or her
employment, when an employee acted with apparent authority, or when an
employee’s knowledge can be imputed to the employer because of the rank he
or she holds within the company.127
The majority distinguished this case from its decision in Ridglea, where the
Fifth Circuit held that knowledge of an employee acting in violation of the law
would not be imputed to the employer unless the employee acted to benefit the
employer.128 KBR sought to have the Ridglea standard extended to its case but
118. Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 8701(3) (2012)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 348.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 349.
125. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v.
Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977)).
126. See id. at 350.
127. Id. 350–53.
128. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 352. This argument is similar to the adverse interest exception that is
invoked when the agent’s interests and the principal’s interests are at odds. See Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Gould, Inc., 70 F.3d 768, 773 (4th Cir. 1995). In these circumstances, the agent’s
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the court refused, holding that 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1) was “meaningfully
distinct” from the provisions of the FCA that the court analyzed in Ridglea.129
In the majority’s opinion, the distinction between the two acts was the type of
damages—damages under the AKA are compensatory, whereas the damages
under the FCA are punitive.130 However, the Fifth Circuit determined, with little
elaboration, that 41 U.S.C. § 8706(a)(1)’s damages were solely compensatory.131
To further justify its reasoning for not extending the holding in Ridglea,132 the
court pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME).133 In ASME, the Court
stated that “under general rules of agency law, principals are liable when their
agents act with apparent authority” even when “the agent acts solely to benefit
himself.”134
C. The Vavra Concurring Opinion: A Focus on Statutory Analysis
Judge Jolly, in his concurring opinion, criticized the majority’s statutory
analysis and considered the broader context in which the term “person” was used
in 41 U.S.C. § 8706.135 While the majority turned to the statute’s definition
section to conclude that “person” includes both individuals and corporations,
Judge Jolly found it necessary to analyze the term “person” as it was modified
in the statute under subsection (a)(1) by the word “knowingly.”136 Judge Jolly
noted that “when a corporation is being sued, the corporation (i.e. the person)
itself must have knowledge of the kickback before liability may arise.”137
For corporations, the knowledge of higher-level employees is “imputable to
the corporation.”138 Judge Jolly concluded that, in cases where acts of officers
or directors of a company led to suit under the AKA, the punishment would be
direct liability as opposed to vicarious liability.139 Under Judge Jolly’s
reasoning, vicarious liability would be reserved for circumstances under
knowledge should not be imputed to the principal. See id. (explaining that knowledge is not
imputed when an agent acts outside the scope of his employment and when the employer and
employee interest are adverse because the employee will probably not perform his proper duty or
tell the employer what he is doing).
129. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 352.
130. See id. at 351–52.
131. See id. at 353.
132. See id. at 350. “We have elaborated little on the holding in Ridglea nor have we applied
it to any other civil statute. In Ridglea itself, we acknowledged the outcome was in tension with
precedent generally construing FCA double damages and forfeiture provisions.” Id. (footnote
omitted).
133. 456 U.S. 556 (1982); Vavra, 727 F.3d at 350–51.
134. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME), 456 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1982).
135. Vavra, 727 F.3d at 354 (Jolly, J., concurring).
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 354–55.
139. Id.
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subsection (a)(1) when knowledge of the employee is imputable—a highly factintensive question.140
Judge Jolly opined that vicarious liability under subsection (a)(1) was
consistent with the purpose of the statute because it punished knowing violations,
which was distinct from violations creating strict liability under subsection
(a)(2).141 He agreed with the majority that knowing violations deserved harsher
punishments, but only in instances where the knowledge of the employee was
clearly imputable.142 Subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit endorsed Judge Jolly’s arguments in a similar case also involving
KBR.143
D. The Federal Circuit Weighs In
In Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. United States,144 another AKA
action against KBR, the United States Court of Federal Claims found that a
corporation could be vicariously liable under both subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2);
however, the particular KBR employees who accepted kickbacks were not
senior enough to trigger vicarious liability.145 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
overturned the lower court’s decision, holding, in accordance with the Fifth
Circuit’s decision, that the employee’s knowledge was imputable when the
employee acted with apparent authority.146
The Federal Circuit noted that the difference between the two subsections was
the degree of knowledge required, and, while acknowledging that there was
confusion in the wording, the legislative history made it clear that subsection
(a)(1) was intended to impose vicarious liability.147 The court then addressed
under what circumstances it would be appropriate for imputing knowledge to
the corporation, pursuant to subsection (a)(1).148
The court stated that an agent’s knowledge is imputed to the principal in cases
where the employee acts within the scope of his or her employment, but noted
that courts have recognized a narrow exception in cases when the employee has
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 356 (“[A]s the majority notes, ‘[i]t is entirely consistent for the statute to punish
knowing violations more severely than those of which the corporation was unaware.’” (alteration
in original)).
143. See Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 728 F.3d 1348, 1367–70 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 167 (2014) (“The difference between [subsection(a)(1)] and
[subsection (a)(2)] is the degree of knowledge that must be proven. The former provision—which
carries a higher penalty—applies if the person knowingly engages in prohibited conduct. The latter
provides for strict liability against a ‘person’ who engages in prohibited conduct.”).
144. 728 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 167 (2014).
145. Id. at 1368–69.
146. Id. at 1370 & n.25
147. Id. at 1368–70.
148. Id. at 1369–70 (citing Long Island Sav. Bank, FSB v. United States, 503 F.3d 1234, 1249–
50 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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an adverse interest.149 The exception applies “when the agent’s conduct is
‘entirely’ in the agent’s interest without even incidental benefit to the
principal.”150 However, the court found that KBR did receive a benefit from the
agent’s actions and, consequently, imputed his knowledge to the company.151
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Newman did not believe that
KBR received a benefit.152 Specifically, Judge Newman suggested that a clear
benefit had to be shown to hold KBR vicariously liable under subsection (a)(1)
before elevating the violation from one that “invoke[s] only the single strict
liability provision of [subsection] (a)(2).”153
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit dismissed the argument that common law
agency principles placed limits on vicarious liability when punitive damages
were involved.154 The court found that “these limits do not apply to ‘the
interpretation of special statutes’ like those giving ‘triple damages.’”155
Moreover, the majority stated, without explanation, that “[t]he ‘special statute’
here, the AKA, with its double damage provision, does not involve punitive
damages . . . [and] is [therefore] outside the scope of . . . the Restatement’s
heightened standard for vicarious liability.”156
E. Impact of Imputing Liability to Employers Under Subsection (a)(1)
The consequences of the Fifth’s Circuit Vavra decision will depend on how
the district court, on remand, applies the knowledge standard to a violation under
subsection (a)(1).157 The broad standard endorsed by the Fifth Circuit that
imputes knowledge of lower-level employees with apparent authority to the
corporation could have a significant impact on the way corporations specify and
police internal anti-kickback practices; regardless of the result, Vavra could
cause an increase in litigation.158 The fact-intensive question of when

149. Id. at 1369–70.
150. Id. at 1369. See also Grassmueck v. Am. Shorthorn Ass’n, 402 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir.
2005) (“The refusal to impute knowledge to the principal of an agent who is acting adversely to the
principal is an acknowledgment that the usual legal fiction of complete agent-principal
communication is unjustified where the agent is acting adversely.” (citing Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Gould, Inc., 70 F.3d 768, 773 (4th Cir. 1995)); In re Scott Acquisition Corp. 364 B.R. 562, 568
(Bankr. D. Del 2007) (“Th[e] [adverse interest] exception is only applicable when the agent is
acting entirely adverse to the principal, and the principal is in no way benefitting from the agent’s
actions.” (citing Beck v. Deloitte & Touche, Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, Ernest & Young, L.L.P.,
144 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998))).
151. Id. at 1372.
152. Id. at 1373 (Newman, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
153. Id. at 1374.
154. Id. at 1370 (majority opinion).
155. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 6 § 217 C, cmt. c (1958)).
156. Id.
157. See Pachter, supra note 79.
158. See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 353 n.14
(5th Cir. 2013) (noting that the lower court, on remand, must consider that “[u]nder that standard .

2015]

Kicking Employers While They Are Down

533

knowledge may be imputed will increase litigation costs and risks, which, in
turn, could promote more early settlements, even in cases where, on the merits,
the contractor is not vicariously liable.159 Moreover, contractors could face an
increased risk of debarment160 if it is found that the contractor took inadequate
corporate measures to detect and prevent kickbacks.161
Therefore, employers must closely monitor the actions of their employees to
deter, detect, and stop kickback activity in its infancy.162 The Vavra decision
will impose “pressure on compliance and ethics . . . programs,” and result in a
“nearly impossible risk management environment,” especially given the absence
of a requirement that an employer authorize an employee’s conduct outside the
scope of his or her employment, or have any knowledge of it.163 One observer

. . KBR cannot be exposed to an unexpected flood of liability for nefarious acts of any and every
member of its worldwide workforce”); Burgett, supra note 10, at 4 (discussing the impact of the
court’s decision). But see Pachter, supra note 79 (“[T]he Court’s assurance against the floodgate
[of litigation] seems hardly sufficient to calm the fears of corporate risk-assessment specialists.”).
159. Burgett, supra note 10, at 4 (“Because the questions of knowledge and attribution of
knowledge are highly fact-intensive, they are likely to survive dispositive pretrial motions. This
increases litigation expense and litigation risk for the defendant corporation, and thereby may tend
to increase the likelihood and amount of settlements . . . .”).
160. “‘Debarment’ means action taken by [an agency head or designee] to exclude a contractor
from government contracting and government approved subcontracting for a reasonable, specified
period.” FELDMAN & KEYES, supra note 34, at 159.
161. See John S. Pachter, 2 KBR Cases Illuminate Kickback Risks For Contractors, LAW360
(Dec. 3, 2013, 8:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/491501/2-kbr-cases-illuminatekickback-risks-for-contractors.
162. Pachter, supra note 79 (advocating ethics and compliance programs, warning not to
engage in kickbacks, and describing penalties of immediate dismissal). In the wake of the Vavra
decision, government contractors may be compelled to become better versed in the Anti-Kickback
Act to ensure that their employees do not bring harm to the company through their own self-dealing.
Through training and compliance programs, the constant monitoring of employees actions, and
prompt investigations, companies will best be able to protect themselves from facing increased
situations of vicarious liability under the Anti-Kickback Act. Stephen R. Spivack et al., Fifth
Circuit’s Ruling On Anti-Kickback Act May Generate More Lawsuits Against Federal Contractors,
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP (July 26, 2013), http://www.babc.com/fifth-circuitsruling-on-anti-kickback-act-may-generate-more-lawsuits-against-federal-contractors-07-262013/.
The KBR decision charges corporate entities with the difficult task of monitoring thirdparty views of employees’ ‘apparent authority’ or face potential liability for those
employees’ actions. To limit this risk, government contractors and other corporate
entities should evaluate their current compliance and oversight measures to ensure that
they are adequate.
The Fifth Circuit Weighs in on Vicarious Liability Under the Anti-Kickback Act, ROPES & GRAY 3
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/alerts/2013/10/20131022_FCA_Alert.
pdf.
163. Gregory A. Brower & Brett W. Johnson, When Enough Is Not Enough: Two Court Rulings
Complicate Corporate Compliance Efforts, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 11, 2013, at 2, available
at http://www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/10-11-13BrowerJohnson_LB.pdf.
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asserted that there is “no amount of hiring screening, training, auditing, or
internal control [that] can adequately control [this] risk.”164
IV. RESOLVING VAVRA’S SHORTFALLS: REQUIRING AN INTENT TO BENEFIT
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the Anti-Kickback Act to make employers
vicariously liable simply because the employee was cloaked with apparent
authority.165 This kind of liability was already clearly contemplated under
subsection (a)(2), but not under subsection (a)(1).166 The Vavra court’s decision
renders it unnecessary for the employee to act with intent to benefit the employer
in order for vicarious liability to apply.167 The court declining to limit damages
for vicarious liability is applied,168 held that damages under the Anti-Kickback
Act are different from punitive damages under the FCA and distinguished the
case from the Fifth Circuit’s previous decision in Ridglea.169
A. The Fifth Circuit Questionably Declined to Extend Ridglea’s Holding to
Vavra
By holding that damages under the AKA are compensatory rather than
punitive, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply the “act-to-benefit” standard it had
previously endorsed in Ridglea.170 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit distinguished
a civil action under the AKA to recover actual losses caused by an employee
from an FCA action designed to recover forfeitures and apply “double damages
far in excess of the actual loss.”171
The court’s view of damages as solely compensatory does not square with
other courts’ interpretations, which have designated the damages under
subsection (a)(1) as punitive.172 While there is no consensus among
jurisdictions, the double damages of the “knowing” violation under subsection
164. Id. at 2–3.
165. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 352 (5th Cir.
2013).
166. See id. at 348 (discussing the district court’s interpretation of the statute).
167. See id. at 353.
168. Id. at 352–53.
169. Id. at 350–51.
170. Id. at 353.
171. Id. at 350 (citing United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966),
superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012)).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Kruse, 101 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“At least part
of the purpose of the Anti–Kickback statute, then, is punitive, and the [c]ourt must continue its
inquiry by determining whether the penalties set by the statute are grossly disproportionate to the
offenses the statute proscribes.”); Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 118 n.3
(2005) (“As discussed further herein, since the Anti–Kickback Act is both remedial and punitive,
the court’s determination was made under a clear and convincing standard rather than the
preponderance of evidence standard typically utilized in civil cases.”); but see United States v.
Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he penalty in [subsection (a)(1)(A)] of twice the
amount of each kickback is primarily remedial in purpose and not punitive in effect.”).
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(a)(1) appear to be designed to punish what the drafters of the Act viewed as
more egregious behavior—a motive akin to the idea behind punitive damages.173
In other cases of vicarious liability involving punitive damages, the Supreme
Court has stated that for knowledge to be imputed, the employee should be
“‘important,’ but perhaps need not be the employer’s ‘top management, officers,
or directors,’ . . . acting ‘in a managerial capacity.’”174 If the Fifth Circuit had
properly determined that the Act provided for punitive damages, then it would
not have followed that the knowledge of any low-level agent with apparent
authority could be imputed to the corporation. Because the damages under the
AKA are, at the very least, quasi-punitive, the Fifth Circuit should have held,
like in Ridglea, that the agent must be in an “important” position to the company,
or that he or she at least acted to benefit the company before the employer could
be found vicariously liable.
To further justify its refusal to extend Ridglea, the Fifth Circuit questionably
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in ASME.175 ASME involved an antitrust
violation in which an agent, cloaked with apparent authority, defrauded a third
party.176 The agent, an employee of Hydrolevel’s competitor, McDonnell &
Miller (M&M), wrote a letter to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) on letterhead containing his employer’s vice president’s name,
prompting a public inquiry into the effectiveness of Hydrolevel’s boiler
product.177 As a result of the agent’s showing of apparent authority, “Hydrolevel
. . . suffer[ed] from market resistance.”178
The actions in ASME differ significantly from violations of the AKA. In
ASME, M&M’s agent, acting with apparent authority, used his position in the
company to deceive the ASME into questioning Hydrolevel, a competing
company.179 Unlike in ASME, in which the ASME was unaware of the fraud of
M&M’s apparent agent and Hydrolevel was harmed by his actions, the
subcontractor involved in an AKA violation is typically not harmed.180 Rather,
the subcontractor is arguably in a better position because it should be in line to
receive preferential treatment. The real victim is the prime contractor whose

173. See supra note 172; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (10th ed. 2009) (defining punitive
damages).
174. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 543 (1999).
175. See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 350–52
(5th Cir. 2013).
176. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. (ASME), 456 U.S. 556, 558–59
(1982).
177. Id. at 561–62.
178. Id. at 563.
179. Id. at 577.
180. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (describing common violations of the
AKA).
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agent accepted kickbacks and opened the prime contractor to liability under the
AKA.181
In general, a subcontractor is not concerned with the authority of the agent
who accepts the offered kickback.182 There is not an AKA violation when the
authority of the agent is used as leverage to fool a subcontractor and, thus, as
Judge Jolly stated, apparent authority has no place in the discussion of when to
impute knowledge to the employer.183 Because the employer is the potential
victim, it is more appropriate for the court to look at whether or not the agent
acted to benefit the principal, instead of whether the agent had apparent
authority, before deciding to impute knowledge to the employer and hold them
accountable through vicarious liability.
To prevent the employer from being unfairly punished for the self-dealing of
its employees without its knowledge, the Fifth Circuit should have extended
Ridglea’s “act-to-benefit” standard. Without any such requirement, violations
of the AKA, when the agent had apparent authority, could increase vicarious
liability litigation.184
B. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision Does Not Comport with Other Federal
Statutes’ Scienter Requirements
In Vavra, the Fifth Circuit viewed AKA’s subsection (a)(1) as an action
grounded in tort law rather than a form of contract fraud.185 Statutes similar to
the AKA, such as the FCA and AKS, punish conduct similar to that punished
under the AKA, but do so in terms of contract fraud.186 Despite this notable
difference, the AKA and FCA are often litigated together, as was the case in
Vavra.187 The Fifth Circuit’s failure to view the AKA in the same light as these
other statutes has led to an inconsistent and confusing interpretation of the
scienter in subsection (a)(1) that requires no actual showing of employer
knowledge.
181. See Schulenberger, supra note 12, at 558 (explaining that the AKA prohibits payments to
agents of prime contractors).
182. See Pachter, supra note 161.
183. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 355 (5th Cir.
2013) (Jolly, J., concurring).
184. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
185. See Vavra, 727 F.3d at 348 (acknowledging the presumption that Congress intended to
incorporate ordinary vicarious liability rules when it creates tort actions).
186. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d 770, 776 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining
the FCA’s application to “contracts that are tainted by kickbacks”).
187. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479
(E.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013). See also United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d
974, 977 (8th Cir.1998) (explaining that the government filed an action seeking penalties under the
AKA and the FCA); Gen. Dynamics Corp., 19 F.3d at 777 (holding that “the AKA does not preempt
remedies of the United States under the FCA and federal common law”); Morse Diesel Int’l, Inc.
v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 116, 117 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (stating that the government brought
counterclaims under the AKA, the FCA, and the Contract Disputes Act among others).
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Because knowledge is not defined in the AKA, this issue may be resolved by
adopting a definition similar to that in the FCA, given that the statutes have a
common objective. The FCA defines “knowingly” as actual knowledge,
deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard.188 Deliberate ignorance, a form of
willful misconduct, arises when one purposefully refuses to acknowledge the
existence of illegal activity.189 Reckless disregard presents a slightly more
lenient standard, addressing grossly negligent conduct, that is not necessarily
intentional, in situations where violations were so apparent that they should have
been known.190
The FCA requires, minimally, a showing of reckless disregard before
imputing knowledge, and the AKA should be no different. The Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation of the AKA makes knowledge of the corporation a foregone
conclusion through its apparent authority analysis.191 By imposing vicarious
liability for “knowing” violations of employees with apparent authority, a
standard so low that almost every interaction between an agent and
subcontractor could be imputable, without any showing of knowledge on part of
the employer, the court wrote the scienter out of subsection (a)(1). As it stands,
“knowingly” under subsection (a)(1) requires no greater showing of culpability
than the strict liability standard set forth in subsection (a)(2).
The Vavra decision has rendered subsection (a)(2) superfluous,
accomplishing what the district court sought to prevent.192 The conduct
constituting a strict liability violation under subsection (a)(2) is now all that is
necessary to establish vicarious liability under (a)(1). The government has no
need to bring a subsection (a)(2) claim against the employer, when a subsection
(a)(1) violation yields twice the damages. A showing of at least gross negligence
or reckless disregard, as is required under the FCA in place of actual knowledge,
should be required to distinguish the two subsections of the AKA.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit confusingly determined that the same unwitting behavior of
an employer that is strictly punished under subsection (a)(2), regardless of the
employee’s intent, will be punished as more egregious behavior under
subsection (a)(1). If employers are likely to be found vicariously liable under
subsection (a)(1) for violations unknown to them, government contractors will
be forced to take additional precautions to prevent AKA violations. Employers
will likely need to institute extensive new controls to ensure that employees are
not engaging in conduct that is detrimental to the employer. Such controls are

188. See supra note 57–58 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
191. United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 351–52 (5th
Cir. 2013)
192. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
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both costly and far from foolproof. The costs will ultimately be passed on to the
taxpayers because they are allowable costs under government contracts.
The Vavra decision should either be reviewed by the Supreme Court or used
as the catalyst for appropriate legislative changes to the AKA. The Fifth Circuit
has blurred the distinction between subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), opening the
door for innocent employer conduct to constitute a knowing violation of the
AKA. The court exceeded the proper limits of judicial interpretation by
determining that an employee’s apparent authority is sufficient to impute
knowledge to create vicarious liability under subsection (a)(1). Even if no
showing of knowledge on the employer’s part is required, intent of the employee
to benefit the employer should be the minimal standard required to attribute
liability to the company under subsection (a)(1). A showing of gross negligence
or reckless disregard by the employer to learn the employee’s actions would be
even more appropriate. Without such a limitation, the court may have opened
the door for increased litigation under subsection (a)(1), which raises costs to
government contractors, and, ultimately, harms the procurement process with
the statute that Congress intended to protect it, the Anti-Kickback Act.

